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A CASE AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE: CARSON EX 
REL. O.C. V. MAKIN AND THE FUTURE OF MAINE’S 
NONSECTARIAN REQUIREMENT 
Blake E. McCartney* 
ABSTRACT 
School choice advocates, such as the nonprofit libertarian law firm, The Institute 
for Justice, have spent decades arguing that states violate the Free Exercise Clause 
when they exclude private religious schools from public programs that otherwise 
provide public dollars to non-religious private schools.  Recently, in Espinoza v. 
Montana Department of Revenue, the Supreme Court effectively agreed with that 
sentiment.  After this victory, the Institute for Justice returned to the state of Maine 
to represent three sets of parents in a renewed effort to defeat Maine’s nonsectarian 
requirement in federal court.  Maine’s nonsectarian requirement provides that private 
religious schools may not participate in Maine’s town tuitioning program, which 
allows students in towns that do not have public schools to receive state funding to 
attend a private or public school of their choice. 
  This Note analyzes that case:  Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin.  In Carson, the 
First Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision that Maine’s nonsectarian requirement 
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.  I posit that the reasoning the First Circuit 
deployed in Carson may not be durable and that if the Supreme Court were to grant 
the plaintiff-appellants’ petition for certiorari, the Court would likely invalidate 
Maine’s nonsectarian requirement.  I then analyze the effect the elimination of the 
nonsectarian requirement would have on Maine’s public schools and how school 
choice opponents may wish to move forward.  More specifically, I suggest that 
Maine and the rest of the nation should consider investing in its public schools before 
outsourcing public education to private entities and interest groups. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite extensive controversy,1 the “educational choice” or “school choice” 
movement has gained significant traction in the past few decades.  Educational 
choice is the ideology that a parent should be to able to use public funds to send her 
child to the school of her choosing, including a private religious school.2  There are 
                                                                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2022.  I am grateful to my brother, J. 
William McCartney, for initially telling me about the Carson case, my professors and mentors for their 
invaluable feedback, and my partner and family for their unwavering support. 
 1.  Brett A. Geier, Funding God’s Schools—A Legal Analysis of Appropriating Public Dollars to 
Parochial Schools: Does Michigan’s Latest Legislation Violate the Separation of Church and State?, 49 
J.L. & EDUC. 285, 296 (2020) (“In particular, school funding raises a contentious debate.  Conflicting 
ideologies have polarized funding discourse at the local, state, and federal levels.  Of the issues 
embedded within school funding, allowing religious schools to receive public funds has proven to be 
highly controversial.”).  
 2.  Educational Choice, THE INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/issues/school-choice/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7C65-LVST] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).  It should be noted that proponents of school choice still refer 
to programs that exclude religious schools as “school choice programs.”   See School Choice in America 
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several types of so-called educational choice programs that state legislatures have 
implemented, including:  (1) voucher programs, (2) town tuitioning programs, and 
(3) tax-credit scholarships.  Voucher programs use public funds to provide families 
with tuition vouchers that they may use to pay all or part of private school tuition.3  
In contrast, town tuitioning programs, which are seen in Maine, Vermont, and New 
Hampshire,4 allow students who live in towns that do not have local public schools 
to use their education tax dollars at a neighboring public school or an approved 
private school of the parents’ choice.5  Finally, tax-credit scholarships grant tax 
credits to people who donate to nonprofits that provide individuals with private 
school scholarships.6  
In recent years, school choice gained more political attention because of former 
President Trump’s support of the movement and his divisive decision to nominate 
Betsy DeVos as the Secretary of Education.  Devos is a school choice advocate, and 
before she worked in the White House she was the board chairwoman of the 
American Federation for Children, which describes itself as “the nation’s voice for 
educational choice.”7  Although both former President Trump and DeVos pushed for 
school choice and tried to the rekindle support for such policies after the onset of the 
Coronavirus pandemic, they ultimately failed to make any significant progress on 
educational choice policy at a national level.8 
In the legal realm, the major force behind the educational choice movement is 
The Institute for Justice (“IJ”).9  IJ is a public interest law firm that litigated two of 
the key Supreme Court educational choice cases, Espinoza v. Montana Department 
of Revenue and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, as well as many other impactful lower 
                                                                                                     
Dashboard, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/school-choice-in-america/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4ACT-DWNF] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021).  For example, Maine’s town tuitioning program, 
which is discussed at length in this Note, is often referred to as a school choice program even though it 
does not provide funds to private religious schools.  See Maine – Town Tuitioning Program, EDCHOICE, 
https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/programs/maine-town-tuitioning-program/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5UN3-K9VJ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021). 
 3.  Types of School Choice, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/types-of-school-
choice/ [https://perma.cc/8AUR-6Y2G] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021). 
 4.  See School Choice in America Dashboard, EDCHOICE, https://www.edchoice.org/school-
choice/school-choice-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/R2SP-65AJ ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2021). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. (“Tax-credit scholarships allow taxpayers to receive full or partial tax credits when they 
donate to nonprofits that provide private school scholarships.”). 
 7.  Alia Wong, Public Opinion Shifts in Favor of School Choice, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/08/school-choice-gaining-popularity/568063/ 
[https://perma.cc/A6BK-KMWC] (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 8.  See Collin Binkley, Trump, DeVos Raise School Choice in Appeal to Vexed Parents, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 14, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/school-choice-education-betsy-devos-
virus-outbreak-archive-ca871432d35abcb71bf12cf7211f9c25 [https://perma.cc/PJC6-E28J].  During the 
onset of the Coronavirus pandemic and virtual schooling, the Trump administration hoped to “convert [] 
parents’ frustration and anger into newfound support for school choice policies that Education Secretary 
Betsy DeVos ha[d] long championed but struggled to advance nationally.”  Id. 
 9.  See generally THE INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/ [https://perma.cc/F4H4-YZGD] (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2021). 
316 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
court cases.10  Most recently, in Espinoza, the Court held in favor of IJ’s clients, who 
were parents that wished to use funding from a Montana tax-credit scholarship 
program to send their children to private religious schools.11  The Court explained 
that once a state decides to subsidize private education, “it cannot disqualify some 
private schools solely because they are religious.”12  After Espinoza, school choice 
advocates believed they had struck gold.13  
IJ was active in Maine long before Espinoza was decided.  Including Carson ex 
rel. O.C. v. Makin—the subject of this Note—IJ has filed three school choice 
lawsuits in the state.14  The organization’s goal is to invalidate a provision of Maine 
law, commonly referred to as “Section 2951(2)” or “Maine’s nonsectarian 
requirement.”15  The nonsectarian requirement excludes private religious schools 
from Maine’s town tuitioning program.16  IJ filed its first Maine-based school choice 
suit in the 1990s, on behalf of parents who wished to use Maine’s town tuitioning 
program to pay for their children’s tuition at Cheverus High School, a private 
Catholic school.17  The case, Bagley v. Raymond School Department, was ultimately 
unsuccessful.18  Several years later, IJ brought a very similar and equally unfruitful 
suit:  Anderson v. Town of Durham.19   
A few years after filing Espinoza in Montana state court, IJ returned to Maine 
and filed Carson in the Federal District Court for the District of Maine.20  The facts 
in Carson are quite similar to the facts in Espinoza.  In both cases, IJ represented 
parents who wanted to use state funding to send their children to private parochial 
schools.21  Because the plaintiffs’ motivations in the cases were similar and the 
actions were filed so closely together, a key educational choice decision—Trinity 
                                                                                                     
 10.  See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 
536 U.S. 639 (2002); see also Recent Educational Choice Cases, THE INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/ 
issues/school-choice/ [https://perma.cc/87BW-H29D] (last visited Apr. 21, 2021). 
 11.  Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2251, 2262. 
 12.  Id. at 2261. 
 13.  See John Kramer, IJ Releases New Educational Choice Guide to State Constitutions After 
Espinoza, THE INST. FOR JUST. (July 7, 2020), https://ij.org/press-release/ij-releases-new-educational-
choice-guide-to-state-constitutions-after-espinoza/ [https://perma.cc/N972-MQ5U].  
 14.  See Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 401 F. Supp. 3d 207 (D. Me. 2019); Anderson v. Town of 
Durham, 2006 ME 39, 895 A.2d 944, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1051 (2006); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. 
Dep't, 1999 ME 60, 728 A.2d 127, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 947 (1999). 
 15.  See 20-A M.R.S.A. § 2951(2) (2018).  Prior to the enactment of Section 2951(2) in 1981, 
religious schools were allowed to apply to become approved private schools for purposes of town 
tuitioning.  Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 5, 728 A.2d 127; see also Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 
25 (1st Cir. 2020) (noting that the suit “takes aim at the program’s requirement that a private school 
must be a ‘nonsectarian school in accordance with the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution’ to qualify as ‘approved’ to receive tuition assistance payments”).  
 16.  § 2951(2). 
 17.  Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶¶ 6-9, 728 A.2d 127. 
 18.  Id. ¶ 17. 
 19.  2006 ME 39, 895 A.2d 944. 
 20.  See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2262 (2020) 
(originally filed on Dec. 16, 2015; decided on June 30, 2020); Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 401 F. 
Supp. 3d 207 (D. Me. 2019) (originally filed on Aug. 21, 2018). 
 21.  See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2262; Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2020).  
However, the program at issue in Carson—Maine’s town tuitioning program—is different than the tax-
credit program litigated in Espinoza. 
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Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer—played a central role in both matters.22  In 
addition, after Espinoza, IJ filed a 28(j) letter23 and tried to use the opinion to bolster 
the Carson case.24  But, even with the heft of Espinoza behind IJ’s arguments, the 
First Circuit decided Carson in favor of the Maine Department of Education.25  The 
Court distinguished Carson from Espinoza and its predecessor Trinity Lutheran, 
with the help of the “status-use” distinction, which is discussed in great detail 
throughout this Note.26  Although Carson provides some much welcome reassurance 
to Establishment Clause proponents and states that do not wish to fund private 
parochial schools, it stands on tenuous footing.  
This Note examines the constitutionality of school choice programs that provide 
public aid to private religious schools.  Part II of this Note will examine the legal 
precedent in school funding cases that implicate the Religion Clauses and explain 
how the Court’s jurisprudence has evolved over time.  Part III will outline the facts 
of Carson and analyze the First Circuit’s reasoning.  Part IV will discuss the 
durability of Carson, and Part V will conclude with commentary on the future of 
school choice in Maine. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The educational choice movement is rooted in the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.27  The 
Establishment Clause states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”28  And the Free Exercise Clause declares that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.29  With the growing 
popularity of school choice programs, our nation’s public schools have become 
“epicenter[s] for religious and state conflict,” implicating the Religion Clauses.30 
At base, the Free Exercise Clause “protect[s] religious observers against unequal 
treatment.”31  The Supreme Court has held that, in general, neutral and generally 
applicable laws that happen to burden an individual’s exercise of religion do not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause.32  On the other hand, a law that burdens religious 
                                                                                                     
 22.  137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); see Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2254-55; Carson, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 209, 
210-12. 
 23.  A “28(j) letter” is a letter that a party may send to the circuit clerk if “pertinent and significant 
authorities [have] come to [the] party’s attention after the party’s brief has been filed—or after oral 
argument but before decision.”  Fed. R. App. P. 28(j). 
 24.  Appellant’s Statement of Supplemental Authority at 2, Carson, 979 F.3d 21 (No. 19-1746). 
 25.  Carson, 979 F.3d at 49. 
 26.  Id. at 37-40. 
 27.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947) (citing Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 
108 (1943) (“The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth . . . commands 
that a state ‘shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .’”)). 
 28.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Geier, supra note 1, at 287. 
 31.  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993). 
 32.  See, e.g., Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) ("[I]f prohibiting the exercise of 
religion . . . is . . . merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, 
the First Amendment has not been offended.”). 
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exercise “that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most 
rigorous of scrutiny.”33  In other words, laws that exclude religious individuals 
because of their religious status implicate the Free Exercise Clause and are subject 
to strict scrutiny.34  At the same time, the Establishment Clause forbids the 
government from getting too entangled with religion.35  Thus, the Religion Clauses 
are in a sort of eternal tug of war.  
A. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing and Lemon v. Kurtzman 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in the context of school funding has evolved 
substantially over the years, with the Court’s early Establishment Clause cases 
calling for greater separation of church and state.36  For example, in Everson v. Board 
of Education of Ewing, the Court proclaimed “[t]he First Amendment has erected a 
wall between church and state.  That wall must be kept high and impregnable.  We 
could not approve the slightest breach.”37  In that case, the Court ultimately decided 
that a New Jersey funding program that reimbursed parents who sent their children 
to private schools—including parochial schools—for transportation costs did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.38  In doing so, the Court emphasized that the 
program was only acceptable because the state was providing funding to the parents 
of the children, not the private religious schools themselves.39  
Several decades later, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court examined the tougher 
question of whether states could provide aid directly to private religious schools.40  
There were two programs at issue in Lemon:  (1) a Pennsylvania program that 
reimbursed nonpublic schools for the cost of teacher salaries and educational 
materials in secular subjects, and (2) a Rhode Island program that directly paid 
                                                                                                     
 33.  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546. 
 34.  Id.  Lukumi is associated with the line of case law in which the Supreme Court “has 
increasingly acknowledged ‘that nondiscrimination is crucial to religious freedom’ and has struck down 
laws that discriminate against religion.”  Brooke Reczka, Note, The Wrong Choice to Address School 
Choice: Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 
237, 241 (2020); see generally Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020). 
 35.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 
U.S. 665, 674 (1969)) (establishing a three-part test to ensure that statutes do not violate the 
Establishment Clause by fostering “an excessive government entanglement with religion”); Walz, 397 
U.S. at 670 (“[T]he very existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts—one that seeks to 
mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); 
see also Stephanie H. Barclay, Untangling Entanglement, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1701, 1702-03 (2020) 
(positing that the Court’s post-Lemon decisions, including American Legion v. American Humanist 
Association, indicate the first two prongs of the Lemon test are dead, but the entanglement prong 
remains somewhat intact). 
 36.  Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. 
 37.  Id. at 18.  It should be noted that several scholars argue the majority’s position on strict 
separation of church and state was based on a misconception of U.S. history.  See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, 
Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 285-86 
(2010). 
 38.  Everson, 330 U.S. at 17. 
 39.  Id. at 17-18.  
 40.  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606; see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362, 373 (1975), overruled 
by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion) (upholding a Pennsylvania program 
insofar as it provided textbooks loans to private religious schools, but not insofar as it provided funds for 
other educational services). 
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nonpublic school teachers a fifteen percent supplement to their regular salary.41  The 
Lemon Court determined that both programs violated the Establishment Clause by 
using a new three-pronged test that aimed to detect “excessive entanglement between 
government and religion.”42  Despite the holding, the Court started to soften its “high 
and impregnable” wall rhetoric.43  Chief Justice Burger declared that the line of 
separation between church and state is “far from being a ‘wall.’”44  He explained that 
it is instead “a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the 
circumstances of a particular relationship.”45  As time went on, the line of separation 
between church and state would become increasingly blurry.46   
B. Mitchell v. Helms and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 
Mitchell v. Helms, and several cases before it, marked a significant pivot from 
the Court’s stronger Establishment Clause precedent.47  In Mitchell, a plurality of the 
Court decided that a federal program that provided funding to lend educational 
materials to public and private secular and non-secular schools did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.48  This was the same kind of direct aid to a private religious 
school that the Court had rejected on Establishment Clause grounds in Lemon.  
However, Justice Thomas, writing for the plurality, explained that the Court had 
“departed from the rule . . . that all government aid that directly assists the 
educational function of a religious school is invalid.”49  Justice Thomas proffered 
that whether a government program violates the Establishment Clause depends upon 
whether “any religious indoctrination that occurs in those schools could reasonably 
be attributed to governmental action.”50  Ultimately, the plurality decided that 
“religious indoctrination” had not occurred in this case because eligibility standards 
for the aid were neutral, and the materials were secular.51 
The Court took a step further in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, holding that Ohio 
                                                                                                     
 41.  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07 (1971). 
 42.  Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1969)) (proclaiming that, 
in order to avoid offending the Establishment clause, a statute must (1) “have a secular legislative 
purpose;” (2) not advance or inhibit religion; and (3) not foster "an excessive government entanglement 
with religion”). 
 43.  Id. at 614. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id.  
 46.  See infra Section II(B).  
 47.  See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (holding that Ohio violated the Establishment 
Clause by using public funds to provide instructional materials, equipment, and transportation for field 
trips to private school students), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (holding that a 
federal program which provided funding to lend educational materials to public and private secular and 
non-secular schools did not violate the Establishment Clause); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 
U.S. 373 (1985) (holding that a school district program which used public funds to provide classes to 
nonpublic school students violated the Establishment Clause), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203 (1997) (holding that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit New York from using federal funds 
to send public school teachers into private religious schools to teach special education to low income 
students). 
 48.  Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801. 
 49.  Id. at 816 (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225). 
 50.  Id. at 809; see Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230-31. 
 51.  Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 830-32. 
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did not offend the Establishment Clause when it created a publicly funded program 
that allowed parents to choose to use vouchers to send their children to private 
religious schools, among other options.52  The Court determined that Ohio’s program 
was “neutral with respect to religion” and did not offend the Establishment Clause—
or involve excess entanglement—because individuals were not forced to choose a 
parochial school, but rather were given the opportunity to make a “true private 
choice.”53  After Zelman, it was clear that states were free to offer school voucher 
programs that included private religious schools, so long as individuals were not 
coerced into choosing the religious schools. 
In Trinity Lutheran and later in Espinoza, the Court would come full circle on 
its early Establishment Clause precedent and claim that not only can a state decide 
to provide public funds to a religious school without violating the Establishment 
Clause, but under the Free Exercise Clause, states may be compelled to provide 
religious schools and organizations with public benefits.54  In these cases, the Court’s 
Establishment Clause inquiry seemed to boil down to the spineless “status-use” 
distinction, which this Note analyzes and discusses in Parts II(b)(ii), II(b)(iii), III, 
and IV.55  After Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, the Establishment Clause arguably 
has an uncertain future. 
C. Locke v. Davey 
In recent years, the Court has made several key decisions on Free Exercise 
challenges in the context of school funding.  In Locke v. Davey, the Court held that 
it was within the state of Washington’s discretion to maintain a publicly funded 
postsecondary scholarship program that explicitly prohibited participants from using 
their scholarship funds to pursue degrees in devotional theology.56  Joshua Davey 
                                                                                                     
 52.  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643-44 (2002).  As the text mentioned earlier, 
Zelman was an IJ case. 
 53.  Id. at 662. 
 54.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) (holding that Missouri 
could not exclude a church, which also hosted a daycare and preschool, from a public program that 
provided funds for playground resurfacing under the Free Exercise Clause); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (holding that Montana could not exclude private religious schools from 
a publicly funded school tax-credit program without violating the Free Exercise Clause); see also Micah 
Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Establishment Clause Appeasement, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 276-77 
(2019) (observing that in the context of the Religion Clauses and government funding, “the Court has all 
but rejected the Lemon framework, which prohibited the state from subsidizing the religious activities of 
religious organizations, in favor of a ‘neutrality’ model, which not only allows but sometimes requires 
state funding of religion”). 
 55.  See infra Sections II(D), II(E), III, and IV. 
 56.  Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715-17 (2004).  This prohibition on funding for devotional 
theology majors was created to ensure the program complied with Washington’s constitution.  Id. at 
719.  Washington’s constitution, like many state constitutions, contains a “no-aid” provision, which has 
been “interpreted as prohibiting even indirectly funding religious instruction that will prepare students 
for the ministry.”  Id.  Thirty-eight states have similar “no-aid provisions.”  Brief of Respondents at 2, 9, 
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (No. 18-1195).  These provisions vary in force and language, but generally 
state that public aid may not be provided to “sectarian schools.”  Id. at 2.  Many no-aid provisions are 
so-called “Blaine Amendments,” named after Senator Blaine of Maine.  Depending on who you ask, all 
of the states’ no-aid provisions are rooted in anti-Catholic sentiment.  Compare Holly Hollman, 
Symposium: What’s “the Use” of the Constitution’s Distinctive Treatment of Religion if it is 
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was awarded one of these scholarships, and he wished to use it to pay for his dual 
degree in pastoral ministries and business management/administration.57  However, 
the pastoral ministries degree was inherently devotional, and it was therefore 
excluded under the program.58  When Davey lost his scholarship because he refused 
to drop his major in pastoral ministries, he sued Washington state officials and 
argued that the program rules violated the Free Exercise Clause, among other 
claims.59   
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected Davey’s contention that the program was 
“presumptively unconstitutional because it was not facially neutral with regard to 
religion.”60  First, the Court acknowledged that the state “could permit [scholarship 
recipients] to pursue a degree in devotional theology.”61  However, the Court 
explained that Washington did not have to do so in this case because there is room 
for “play in the joints” between the clauses, and “there are some state actions 
permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise 
Clause.”62  Second, the majority distinguished the scholarship program from the 
Lukumi line of cases63 by noting “the State's disfavor of religion (if it can be called 
that) is of a far milder kind.”64  The Court emphasized that the scholarship program 
did not impose “criminal [or] civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite” 
and did “not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving 
a government benefit.”65  In bolstering this argument, the Court noted that the 
prohibition on funding for devotional theology was not born of religious animus.66  
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that “since the founding of our country,” 
there has been a general unwillingness to use taxpayer funds to support the 
                                                                                                     
Disregarded as Discrimination?, SCOTUSBLOG (July 2, 2020, 10:14 AM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/07/symposium-whats-the-use-of-the-constitutions-distinctive-
treatment-of-religion-if-it-is-disregarded-as-discrimination/ (“Because many no-funding provisions 
predated the advent of significant Catholic immigration, the religious liberty interests they serve cannot 
properly be dismissed as related to any anti-religious bias.”), with Richard D. Komer, Trinity Lutheran 
and the Future of Educational Choice: Implications for State Blaine Amendments, 44 MITCHELL 
HAMLINE L. REV. 551, 565, 577-78 (2018) (arguing that Blaine Amendments were motivated by anti-
Catholic sentiment).  Interestingly, even though Senator Blaine was from Maine, Maine does not have a 
no-aid provision in its constitution.  Maine created its nonsectarian requirement for a variety of reasons, 
including providing a secular public-school equivalent.  See Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 
47 (1st Cir. 2020). 
 57.  Locke, 540 U.S. at 717. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 717-18. 
 60.  Id. at 720. 
 61.  Id. at 719. 
 62.  Id. at 718-19 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court first used the phrase “play in the 
joints” in Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1969).  Judge Lipez of the First Circuit has 
commented:  “‘play in the joints’ is a slippery phrase with no settled meaning.”  Kermit V. Lipez, 
Reflections on the Church/State Puzzle, 72 ME. L. REV. 325, 336 n.58 (2020); see also Locke, 540 U.S. 
at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to “play in the joints” as “not so much a legal principle as a 
refusal to apply any principle when faced with competing constitutional directives”). 
 63.  See Reczka, supra note 34, at 241-42. 
 64.  Locke, 540 U.S. at 720. 
 65.  Id. at 720-21. 
 66.  The Court reasoned that the no-aid provision in Washington’s Constitution was not a “Blaine 
Amendment” rooted in anti-Catholic sentiment. Id. at 723 n.7. 
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ministry.67   
The dissenters believed that the Court’s reasoning was weak and lacked a 
workable test, but the next school funding case would fabricate a new rule—the 
status-use distinction—out of the Locke holding.68   
D. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer 
In 2017, thirteen years after Locke, the Supreme Court decided Trinity Lutheran.  
The majority held that Missouri violated the Free Exercise Clause when it excluded 
a church—which also hosted a daycare and preschool—from a public program that 
provided funds for playground resurfacing.69  The Court asserted that Missouri’s 
policy “expressly discriminate[d] against otherwise eligible recipients by 
disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character” 
and that such a policy required strict scrutiny.70  Chief Justice Roberts distinguished 
Locke by formulating the status-use distinction.71  The Chief Justice argued that, 
unlike Joshua Davey, who “was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed 
to do,” the Trinity Lutheran plaintiffs were denied the playground resurfacing funds 
because of who they were.72  Justices Kagan and Breyer joined the majority in Trinity 
Lutheran, likely because the Chief Justice agreed to add his now infamous footnote, 
which caveated:  “[t]his case involves express discrimination based on religious 
identity with respect to playground resurfacing.  We do not address religious uses of 
funding or other forms of discrimination.”73  The Court’s decision was condemned 
by the dissenters,74 and while some hoped this status-use reasoning would be cabined 
to a playground case, Espinoza dashed those hopes.75 
E. Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue 
The program at issue in Espinoza was established by the Montana State 
                                                                                                     
 67.  Id. at 722-23 (“Since the founding of our country, there have been popular uprisings against 
procuring taxpayer funds to support church leaders, which was one of the hallmarks of an ‘established’ 
religion. . . . Most States that sought to avoid such an establishment around the time of the founding 
placed in their constitutions formal prohibitions against using tax funds to support the ministry.”). 
 68.  See id. at 726-35.  Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent and added his own brief 
dissenting opinion.  Id.; see infra Section II(D) (discussing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. 
Comer). 
 69.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024-25 (2017). 
 70.  See id. at 2021.  Missouri does have a no-aid provision that prohibits the state from providing 
aid to “any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher 
thereof, as such.”  Id. at 2017 (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 7).  The Trinity Lutheran opinion did not 
discuss whether Missouri’s no-aid provision was born of anti-Catholic sentiment. 
 71.  Id. at 2016; see Andrew A. Thompson, Note, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer 
and the “Play in the Joints Between Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion, 96 TEX. L. REV. 
1079, 1089 (arguing that the Chief Justice invented the status-use distinction “out of whole cloth”). 
 72.  Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2016. 
 73.  Id. at 2024 n.3. 
 74.  Id. at 2038 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority “does not acknowledge that 
our precedents have expressly approved of a government’s choice to draw lines based on an entity’s 
religious status”). 
 75.  See Reczka, supra note 34, at 251; see generally Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. 
Ct. 2246, 2251 (2020). 
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Legislature, and it provided tuition aid to parents who chose to send their children to 
private schools.76  The program worked by granting a tax credit to anyone who 
donated to a certain scholarship organization.77  These scholarship organizations 
would, in turn, award scholarship funds to children who attended private schools.78  
Shortly after the legislature created the program, Montana’s Department of Revenue 
enacted Rule 1.79  Rule 1 stated that the scholarships could not be used at sectarian 
schools, and it was created so that the program would conform with Montana’s no-
aid provision.80   
In response to Rule 1, three mothers—represented by IJ—filed suit in Montana 
state court.81  The mothers wished to use the scholarships to send their children to 
religious schools and alleged that the program, and Rule 1, discriminated against 
them “on the basis of their religious views.”82  The case made its way up to the 
Montana Supreme Court, which held that the program had to be invalidated 
altogether.83  After that decision, the Supreme Court granted the mothers’ petition 
for certiorari.84 
A five-justice majority held for the mothers.85  In doing so, it relied heavily on 
Trinity Lutheran and framed the case in terms of a free exercise violation based on 
“religious status” instead of “religious use.”86  The Court asserted that Montana's no-
aid provision barred religious schools, and parents who wished to send their children 
to said schools, “from public benefits solely because of the religious character of the 
schools.”87  Thus, the Court concluded, Montana’s scholarship program was subject 
to strict scrutiny.88   
First, in reaching its decision, the majority distinguished the case from Locke, 
arguing that the tax-credit scholarship program involved pure status-based 
discrimination.89  The Court posited that Montana’s program, unlike the program at 
                                                                                                     
 76.  Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2251. 
 77.  Id. at 2251. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 2252. 
 80.  Id.; see MONT. CONST. art. X, § 6(1).  The majority did not determine whether Montana’s no-
aid provision was born of anti-Catholic sentiment.  Instead, it agreed with the state that “the historical 
record is complex.”  Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2259.  Justice Alito passionately—and hypocritically—
warned of the evils of discrimination in his concurrence.  Id. at 2268 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[In Ramos 
v. Louisiana] I argued in dissent that [discriminatory] motivation, though deplorable, had no bearing on 
the laws’ constitutionality . . . . But I lost, and Ramos is now precedent.  If the original motivation for 
the laws mattered there, it certainly matters here.”).  Justice Alito conspicuously failed to mention 
discriminatory intent in an abortion case decided shortly after Ramos.  See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. 
Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2153-2172 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting); Strict Scrutiny: Trollito, THE APPEAL 
(July 6, 2020) (downloaded using Spotify) (commenting on Justice Alito’s Espinoza concurrence:  “it’s 
a very opportunistic, performative humility”). 
 81.  Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2252. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 2253. 
 84.  Id. at 2254. 
 85.  Id. at 2262-63. 
 86.  Id. at 2255-56 (“This case also turns expressly on religious status and not religious use.”); see 
also Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2017). 
 87.  Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2255. 
 88.  Id. at 2257. 
 89.  Id.  
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issue in Locke, “does not zero in on any ‘essentially religious’ course of instruction,” 
but rather “bars all aid to religious schools” because of what they are: religious 
schools.90  To bolster its argument that Locke is distinguishable, the Court pointed to 
the lack of founding-era support for Rule 1.91  
Next, the majority determined that Montana’s justification for Rule 1 did not 
satisfy strict scrutiny.92  It held that Montana could not justify excluding private 
religious schools from the program because it wished to achieve a stronger separation 
of church and state.93  Notably, the Court declared that:  “[a] State need not subsidize 
private education.  But once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private 
schools solely because they are religious.”94   
Finally, the Court dispensed with Montana’s argument that there was no Free 
Exercise Clause violation “because the Montana Supreme Court ultimately 
eliminated the scholarship program altogether.”95  Two separate dissenters—Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor—agreed with Montana’s contention.96  The majority, 
however, rebutted Montana’s assertion by arguing that the Montana Supreme Court 
had no business terminating the program because it should have recognized that Rule 
1 violated the Free Exercise Clause.97 
In a third dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, argued that the 
majority should have paid more attention to Establishment Clause precedent and 
further engaged with the principle that there “is room for play in the joints” between 
the Religion Clauses.98  The majority flatly rejected this suggestion, stating that the 
dissent’s “‘room[y]’ or ‘flexible’ approaches to discrimination against religious 
organizations and observers would mark a significant departure from our free 
exercise precedents.  The protections of the Free Exercise Clause do not depend on 
a ‘judgment-by-judgment analysis’ regarding whether discrimination against 
religious adherents would somehow serve ill-defined interests.”99 
 Espinoza was a major victory for school choice advocates, and it set extremely 
favorable precedent.  However, the decision left the status-use distinction intact, 
providing a potential opening for school choice opponents and states who do not 
                                                                                                     
 90.  Id. at 2257 (quoting Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2023). 
 91.  Id. at 2257-59; see also Lipez, supra note 62, at 370. 
 92.  Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261. 
 93.  Id. at 2260. 
 94.  Id. at 2261. 
 95.  Id. at 2261, 2262-63. 
 96.  Id. at 2281 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Kagan, J.) (noting that because the Montana 
Supreme Court decision “put all private school parents in the same boat[,]” the “Court had no occasion 
to address the matter”); id. at 2292 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 97.  Id. at 2262 (quoting Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 614 (Mont. 2018) 
(“Had the Court recognized that this was, indeed, ‘one of those cases’ in which application of the no-aid 
provision ‘would violate the Free Exercise Clause,’ the Court would not have proceeded to find a 
violation of that provision.  And, in the absence of such a state law violation, the Court would have had 
no basis for terminating the program.  Because the elimination of the program flowed directly from the 
Montana Supreme Court’s failure to follow the dictates of federal law, it cannot be defended as a neutral 
policy decision, or as resting on adequate and independent state law grounds.”)). 
 98.  Id. at 2281-93, 2282 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“‘[P]lay in the joints’ should, in my view, play a 
determinative role here.”).  
 99.  Id. at 2257. 
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wish to fund private religious schools.100  This opening was central to the First 
Circuit’s decision in Carson.101 
III. CARSON EX REL. O.C. V. MAKIN 
In Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, the First Circuit addressed the question of 
whether Maine’s nonsectarian requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause, among 
other claims.102 
A. Facts and Procedural Background 
If a school administrative unit (“SAU”)103 in Maine does not (1) maintain a 
public elementary or postsecondary school or (2) contract with another public 
elementary or postsecondary school for school privileges, then the SAU must pay 
tuition “at the public school or the approved private school of the parent’s choice at 
which the student is accepted.”104  In order for a private school to be approved to 
receive public funds for tuition, it must fulfil the nonsectarian requirement and be a 
“nonsectarian school in accordance with the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.”105   
The plaintiff-appellants in Carson, who are represented by the Institute of 
Justice (“IJ”), are three sets of parents of children who live in towns where the SAU 
is obligated to pay tuition at a public or approved private school of the parents’ 
choice.106  Two of the sets of parents, the Carsons and Gilleses, send their children 
to Bangor Christian School (“BCS”).107  The other parents, the Nelsons, use town 
tuitioning to send their daughter to a state approved private school, but would prefer 
to send her to Temple Academy (“TA”), which is a parochial school.108  All three 
sets of parents argued that the nonsectarian requirement discriminated against them 
on the basis of religion and therefore violated their free exercise rights.109   
In the trial court, the parents argued that Trinity Lutheran had effectively 
overruled a First Circuit precedential case:  Eulitt v. Maine Department of 
Education.110  Eulitt, which had very similar facts to Carson,111 was decided before 
                                                                                                     
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 34 (1st Cir. 2020). 
 102.  Id. at 26. 
 103.  Maine uses the term “school administrative unit” instead of the usual term, “school district.”  
Each SAU has a different governance structure.  See Structure & Governance, ME. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://www.maine.gov/doe/schools/structure [https://perma.cc/CY6C-KL3F] (last visited Apr. 21, 
2021). 
 104.  20-A M.R.S.A. §§ 5203(4), 5204(4) (2018). 
 105.  § 2951(2). 
 106.  Carson, 979 F.3d at 26. 
 107.  Id. at 27. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 32 (“The plaintiffs contend that the ‘nonsectarian’ requirement discriminates against them 
based on their religion and thereby violates the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
 110.  386 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 2004); see Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 401 F. Supp. 3d 207, 209-11 
(D. Me. 2019). 
 111.  Although the facts in Eulitt and Carson were very similar, there was one difference.  In Eulitt, 
the town that the parents lived contracted with a local public school, and therefore the parents could only 
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Trinity Lutheran, and it relied heavily on Locke.112  In Eulitt, the First Circuit 
interpreted Locke to mean that “state entities, in choosing how to provide education, 
may act upon their legitimate concerns about excessive entanglement with religion, 
even though the Establishment Clause may not require them to do so.”113  Applying 
that reasoning, Eulitt held that Maine’s nonsectarian requirement did not violate the 
Free Exercise Clause because the state was simply exercising its legitimate right to 
avoid excessive entanglement with religion.114  In Carson, the district court 
ultimately disagreed with the plaintiffs and determined that Trinity Lutheran did not 
clearly overrule Eulitt.115  The court applied Eulitt to the facts of Carson and upheld 
Maine’s nonsectarian requirement.116  The plaintiffs timely appealed the decision to 
the First Circuit.117 
The Supreme Court decided Espinoza nearly one year after the trial court’s 
decision in Carson.118  In the wake of Espinoza, an IJ attorney released a statement 
proclaiming that the decision “ensures that no state, whether it has a Blaine 
Amendment or not, can exclude parents from choosing religious educational options 
just because they participate in a private educational choice program.”119  In light of 
their win at the district court, the IJ attorneys representing the plaintiffs in Carson 
hastily filed a 28(j) letter to the First Circuit.120  In the letter, the attorneys pulled 
from Espinoza’s favorable language, asserting:  “[w]hen otherwise eligible recipients 
are disqualified from a public benefit ‘solely because of their religious character,’ 
we must apply strict scrutiny.” 121  In response to IJ’s new-found support, the state 
of Maine contended that (1) “[t]he nature of the benefits at issue in Espinoza and 
here are different,” and (2) Maine does not exclude sectarian schools because of their 
“status,” but rather because they “use” funds to “promote or advance [a] particular 
religion.”122  The First Circuit found merit in the State’s second argument:  that 
Maine does not exclude sectarian schools because of their “status.”123 
B. The First Circuit’s Analysis 
After concluding that the parents had standing,124 the First Circuit explained that 
                                                                                                     
send their children to private school if it were approved on an “individualized assessment of educational 
benefit.”  Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 346-47, 349 n.1. 
 112.  Id. at 355. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 356. 
 115.  Carson, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 211. 
 116.  Id. at 211-12. 
 117.   Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 979 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2020). 
 118.  See generally Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); Carson, 401 F. 
Supp. 3d 207. 
 119.  Kramer, supra note 13.  
 120.  Statement of Supplemental Authority at 1, Carson, 979 F.3d 2 (No. 19-1746); see Fed. R. App. 
P. 28(j). 
 121.  Statement of Supplemental Authority at 2, Carson, 979 F.3d 21 (No. 19-1746). 
 122.  Response to Statement of Supplemental Authority, Carson, 979 F.3d 21 (No. 19-1746). 
 123.  Carson, 979 F.3d at 38. 
 124.  The state contended that the parents could not show redressability because the private religious 
schools in question would not “apply to be ‘approved’ to receive tuition assistance payments if, by 
receiving such public funding, they would” subject themselves to the Maine Human Rights Act’s 
prohibition against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Id. at 30.  This was an 
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the precedential case that controlled in the trial court, Eulitt, would not determine the 
outcome of this matter.125  The court reasoned that Eulitt could not control because 
of an exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine.126  The law-of-the-circuit doctrine 
proclaims that circuit courts must follow precedent from their own court.127  
However, this general rule must yield when Supreme Court precedent legitimately 
questions a circuit court’s previous opinion.128  Here, Trinity Lutheran, and now 
Espinoza, called Eulitt into question because (1) Eulitt did not address whether the 
nonsectarian requirement was based on religious “status” or “use,” and (2) both cases 
offered insight on Locke that Eulitt did not have.129  Thus, the court decided that 
Eulitt fell under the exception to the law-of-the-circuit doctrine and could not 
control.130 
After deciding that Eulitt would not determine the outcome of the case, the First 
Circuit addressed the parents’ Free Exercise Claim in light of Trinity Lutheran and 
Espinoza.  The parents argued that the nonsectarian requirement “impermissibly 
single[d] them out for unequal treatment based on religion,” and excluded them from 
a public benefit on the basis of their religious status.131  To determine whether 
Maine’s nonsectarian requirement involved status-based discrimination, the court 
examined (1) “[w]hat constitutes discrimination based ‘solely on religious status,’” 
(2) whether the nonsectarian requirement discriminated based on status, and (3) 
whether, if the requirement did not discriminate based on status, it “punish[ed] the 
plaintiffs’ religious exercise nonetheless.”132 
First, to define the term “status-based discrimination,” the court analyzed the 
language from Espinoza and Trinity Lutheran.133  The court observed that in both of 
those cases—where the state programs did discriminate on the basis of status—the 
rules excluding religious entities used language like “controlled” or “owned” by a 
church or “religiously-affiliated.”134  It further observed that in Espinoza, the 
Supreme Court noted that discrimination against a recipient based on its “affiliation 
with or control by a religious institution differ[s] from discrimination in handing out 
that aid based on the religious use to which the recipient would put it.”135 
Second, after examining the language and reasoning behind Maine’s 
nonsectarian requirement, the court concluded that the nonsectarian requirement did 
                                                                                                     
interesting and creative argument on the state’s part, and it garnered the attention of the ACLU of 
Maine.  See ACLU in Court in Case Over Taxpayer-Funded Religious Training, ACLU MAINE (June 
24, 2019), https://www.aclumaine.org/en/press-releases/aclu-court-case-over-taxpayer-funded-religious-
training [https://perma.cc/J2T8-A4C4].  Ultimately, the Court dismissed the state’s standing argument 
because even if BCS and TA decided not to participate in town tuitioning, “the invalidation of § 
2951(2)'s ‘nonsectarian’ requirement would restore the plaintiffs' now non-existent opportunity to find 
religious education for their children that qualifies for public funding.”  Carson, 979 F.3d at 31. 
 125.  Carson, 979 F.3d at 32. 
 126.  Id. at 32-36. 
 127.  United States v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64, 66 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 128.  Carson, 979 F.3d at 32-33.  
 129.  Id. at 33-35. 
 130.  Id. at 32. 
 131.  Id. at 36-37. 
 132.  Id. at 37. 
 133.  Id. at 37-38. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
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not discriminate on the basis of status.136  The nonsectarian requirement reads:  “[a] 
private school may be approved for the receipt of public funds for tuition purposes 
only if it . . . [i]s a nonsectarian school in accordance with the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.”137  In other words, a private school may participate 
in town tuitioning—and be eligible to receive public funds—so long as it is not a 
religious school.  The plain reading of the requirement seems to suggest that the 
statute discriminates on the basis of status.  However, the First Circuit disagreed and 
instead determined that it “impose[d] a use-based restriction.”138 
The court explained that this was not status-based discrimination because both 
the former and current Commissioners of the Maine Department of Education and 
the Attorney General agreed that Maine’s “determination [of] whether a school is 
‘nonsectarian’ depends on the sectarian nature of the educational instruction that the 
school will use the tuition assistance payments to provide.”139  This was in contrast 
to the states’ prohibitions in Espinoza and Trinity Lutheran, which were based on 
whether the school was “controlled by a church.”140  Thus, under the First Circuit’s 
reading, if a state excludes a religious entity from a public benefit because it is 
controlled by a church then it is status-based discrimination.  On the other hand, if a 
state excludes a religious entity from a public benefit because it will use the benefit 
for a religious purpose, then it is employing permissible use-based discrimination 
under Locke, Trinity Lutheran, and Espinoza.  The court also highlighted that the 
nonsectarian requirement states that a private school may be eligible to enroll in town 
tuitioning so long as it is “a nonsectarian school in accordance with the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.”141  The court stated that the phrase 
“in accordance with the First Amendment” gave credit to the state’s argument that 
the nonsectarian requirement is indeed constitutional.142  In sum, the court surmised 
that Maine’s nonsectarian requirement did not discriminate on the basis of status.143 
Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that there was no legitimate difference between 
discrimination based on status versus use, and therefore, the nonsectarian 
requirement did punish their religious exercise.144  In making this argument, the 
plaintiffs relied on Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinions in Trinity Lutheran and 
Espinoza.145  The court rejected this argument, pointing out that “nothing in either 
one of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrences suggests that the government penalizes a 
fundamental right simply because it declines to subsidize it.”146  The court 
determined that the nonsectarian requirement simply declined to subsidize religious 
education because (1) the program is merely an avenue for “students who cannot get 
                                                                                                     
 136.  Id. at 38. 
 137.  20-A M.R.S.A. § 2951(2) (2018). 
 138.  Carson, 979 F.3d at 38. 
 139.  Id. at 37-38. 
 140.  Id. at 39. 
 141.  20-A M.R.S.A. § 2951(2) (2018); see Carson, 979 F.3d at 39. 
 142.  Carson, 979 F.3d at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143.  Id. at 42 (“Instead, we understand this restriction to bar BCS and TA from receiving the 
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assistance program.”). 
 144.  See id. at 42. 
 145.  Id. at 40-41. 
 146.  Id. at 44. 
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a public school education from their own SAU . . . [to] get an education that is 
‘roughly equivalent to the education they would receive in public schools;’” and (2) 
Maine’s decision to restrict religious teachings in its public schools—and its town 
tuitioning program—“is also wholly legitimate, as there is no question that Maine 
may require its public schools to provide a secular educational curriculum rather than 
a sectarian one.”147  
C. Holding 
In summary, the First Circuit concluded that, even in light of Trinity Lutheran 
and Espinoza, strict scrutiny did not apply, and the nonsectarian requirement did not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause.148  In coming to this conclusion, the court 
determined that (1) Maine’s nonsectarian requirement did not discriminate on the 
basis of status, and (2) Maine’s town tuitioning program does not need to provide 
funding to parochial schools because the program is simply a way of connecting 
“students who cannot get a public school education from their own SAU” with a 
public education equivalent, and it is within Maine’s discretion to provide a secular 
public education.149 
IV. STANDING ON UNSTEADY GROUND 
Although Carson provides some much welcome reassurance to states that do 
not wish to fund private parochial schools, the decision rests on precedent that may 
not prove to be durable.  Some argue that the new conservative super-majority may 
decide to abandon the status-use distinction altogether.150 
For one, two key conservative justices disfavor the status-use distinction.  
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, who joined Chief Justice Roberts’ Espinoza opinion, 
have both expressed skepticism of the status-use line.  Justice Gorsuch remarked in 
his Espinoza concurrence that “any jurisprudence grounded on a status-use 
distinction seems destined to yield more questions than answers.”151  Justice Thomas 
joined Justice Gorsuch’s Trinity Lutheran concurrence, where the Court originally 
deployed the status-use distinction.152  In that opinion, Justice Gorsuch lamented, “I 
harbor doubts about the stability of such a line.”153  In addition, Justice Sotomayor 
                                                                                                     
 147.  Id. 45-46. 
 148.  Id. at 42-54. 
 149.  Id. at 40, 42-46.  The Court also determined that the nonsectarian requirement did not violate 
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 151.  Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2275 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
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J., concurring in part, joined by Thomas, J.). 
 153.  Id. at 2025. 
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has also expressed disapproval of the status-use distinction.154   
Such skepticism is warranted, as the line makes little logical sense.  Religious 
organizations naturally put their funds to religious uses.155  Further, most religious 
schools tout religious teachings as a benefit of the education that they offer.156  
Because religious status and use are so enmeshed, it makes little sense for the 
constitutionality of a law to turn on whether it excludes a religious entity from a 
benefit based on its religious status or religious use. 
Although the status-use standard is mystifying, it is challenging to find a 
workable alternative.  For those who are wary of entanglement of church and state, 
the only other feasible alternative to the status-use distinction is the principle that 
there is “play in the joints” between the Religion Clauses.157  Justice Breyer vouched 
for this principle in his Espinoza dissent,158 but “play in the joints” is less of a 
standard and more of an amorphous guideline.159  Further, with Justice Ginsburg’s 
passing, it is likely that only three Justices would sign on to the “play in the joints” 
approach.160  Given the precedent and the conservative composition of the Supreme 
Court, school choice opponents will likely need to look beyond the courts to stop the 
school choice movement’s momentum. 
V. THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL CHOICE IN MAINE 
After the First Circuit’s decision, IJ immediately filed a petition for certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court.161  IJ Senior Attorney Tim Keller proclaimed that 
the decision “allows the state of Maine to continue discriminating against families 
and students seeking to attend religious schools.”162  If the Carson plaintiffs are 
granted certiorari and Section 2951(2) is invalidated, it could have a negative impact 
on Maine’s public education system, specifically, in public schools that have a high 
percentage of town tuitioning students.  Setting aside the issue of religious schools, 
public schools lose funding when town tuitioning students choose private schools.  
This is because Maine’s public school funding model, Essential Programs and 
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Services (“EPS”), largely doles out funding based on SAU pupil counts.163  Under 
EPS, when students leave a school, they take their dollars with them.  As Maine 
school enrollment rates have dropped over the years due to rural population 
decline,164 rural public schools have become increasingly dependent on their town 
tuitioning students to remain solvent.165  To date, Maine has only approved eight 
primary private schools and twelve private postsecondary schools for participation 
in town tuitioning.166  In short, even though public schools have a relatively small 
number of private schools to compete with, they are still desperate to retain their 
town tuitioning students and dollars.167 
If private religious schools are permitted to participate in the program as well, 
the number of town tuitioning students choosing private schools would surely grow, 
making this existing problem worse.168  Let us take a hypothetical Maine high school 
as an example of how this would play out.  Each grade has one-hundred children in 
it and thirty of those children are from towns that use town tuitioning.  Each of these 
children attend this school because they have elected to go to the closest public 
school.  However, when more private schools in the area become approved for town 
tuitioning, twelve children in each grade leave to attend various private schools.169  
When those students leave, the school loses the funding it received for those forty-
eight children.  While the school may be able to cut some costs, it still needs to pay 
the teachers the same salary, maintain the same building, bus students, and deliver 
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the same programs and services.  Thus, even though the school has fewer children in 
it—and therefore less funding—it largely maintains the same expenses.170  To help 
alleviate some of the funding issues that town tuitioning brings, Maine could decide 
to exclude private schools from the town tuitioning program altogether. 
Even if the Carson plaintiffs are denied certiorari and the case ends here, more 
school choice litigation is on the way.  IJ currently has five other educational choice 
cases pending in other states, and it will likely file more.171  In fact, IJ has cases that 
are nearly identical to Carson pending in both Vermont and New Hampshire, the 
other states that have town tuitioning programs.172  New Hampshire is in the First 
Circuit, but Vermont is in the Second Circuit which could yield a different 
interpretation of Espinoza.  IJ holds itself out “as the nation’s preeminent courtroom 
defender of educational choice programs,” and there is surely more action to come.173 
Given this situation, Maine—and the rest of the country—must consider the 
impacts of school choice and what it could mean for public education.  Proponents 
of educational choice argue that “[t]hese programs give families financial assistance 
to choose private schooling that best fits their children's individual needs.”174  On the 
other hand, skeptics posit that school choice programs primarily benefit families who 
are already well-off and do not include the conditions necessary “for a fair and equal 
scheme of school choice.”175  These conditions would include things such as (1) 
prohibiting parents “from adding money to the voucher they receive, so that income 
deficiencies are neutralized,” and (2) only providing vouchers to economically 
disadvantaged children.176  Necessary restrictions such as these are not in the 
proposals presented by organizations like IJ and American Federation for 
Children.177  If our goal is to give children “a chance at a great education, no matter 
where they live,”178 we should fund and fix the public school system we already have 
in place, instead of further fracturing it and out-sourcing public education to private 
interest groups like private schools and religious organizations.  
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